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ABSTRACT
The paper concerns production theory when some inputs are quality
differentiated. Our approach is to marry hedonic theory and the duality
theory of cost functions. We then apply the theory to the case of coal-
fired electric power generation where fuel quality depends on sulfur and
ash impurities. Environmental regulations induce a negative value on
sulfur whereas ash impurities degrade performance and thus reduce
production possibilities. A number of empirical results emerge
including a fairly elastic demand for sulfur and significant rates of
technical change that are sulfur and ash saving though capital using.
(H.
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I . INTRODUCTION
Production theory typically involves a finite set of distinct and
well defined inputs. Duality theory is well developed in this situation
and involves a cost function with as arguments a finite set of prices
corresponding to the inputs. This paper concerns the situation where
some inputs are differentiated by quality; in essence there are an
infinite set of possible inputs corresponding to different quality
levels. Firms choose not only quantities of inputs but quality levels
as well. This situation cannot be handled simply by making costs a
function of quality since the price of all quality levels are
simultaneously considered by the firm when choosing the optimal quality.
Examples of quality differentiated inputs into production are
legion. Basic metal manufacturing chooses among different ore grades;
electric power producers choose among different fuel quality levels;
manufacturing industries face choices regarding the quality of the labor
inputs. In fact an input into production that is not
quality-differentiated would seem to be the exception rather than the
rule.
The traditional approach to quality differentiation is to deal
with an hedonic price function, parameterized by quality. The
derivative of the hedonic price function with respect to the quality
parameter gives the marginal valuation of quality, the "price" of
quality. However, as pointed out by McConnell and Phipps (1987) among
others, the appropriate parameter is not the "price" of quality but the
entire price function; firms choose the optimal quality level taking
into account the entire price function. The implication is that the
cost function has as a "parameter" the entire price function, or some
summary measure of that function.
This paper is divided into two parts. In the next section we
modify conventional production theory to account for quality
differentiated inputs. This involves two issues. One is the
modification of production and cost functions to include differentiated
inputs and development of the associated curvature and monotonicity
conditions. The second issue concerns defining the price functions for
these inputs. This entails an extension of hedonic price theory.
The second part of the paper concerns an application of the theory
to estimating the technology of electric power generation. Coal is used
as a power generation fuel and differs greatly in terms of quality.
Fuel quality affects plant performance as well as emissions of regulated
pollutants. We examine the coal-fired power plants licensed between
1971 and 1979 in the U.S.; these plants were subject to an emission
limit as their only regulation of sulfur output. In this empirical
analysis, we interpret the estimated cost function in terms of
substitution between positive and negative inputs, scale effects and
technical change.
I I . THEORY
There are two basic situations that induces a firm to place
different valuations on different quality levels of the same product.
The most common situation is that a higher quality input reduces input
requirements, ceteris paribus . For instance, higher quality labor,
while more costly, allows less labor and/or other inputs to be used to
obtain the same output level. Or, higher quality coal reduces
expenditures on pollution control equipment. Alternately, higher input
quality permits the same inputs to be used to yield more positively
valued output.
A. Production
The basic situation we will consider is a production technology
involving a vector of outputs, y. These outputs may be desirable (e.g.,
electricity) or undesirable (e.g., smoke). Inputs will be assumed to be
conventional goods, x, except for one input, q, which is available in a
variety of qualities (possibly vector valued), z. Without loss of
generality, let x be a composite and thus a scalar. Letting t denote
the state of technology, the production set can be expressed implicitly
as
g{x,q,z,y, t) ^ (1)
with the frontier defined when (1) holds with equality. Assume g is
quasi-convex; i.e., the level sets (defined when the right-hand side
of (1) is replaced by any constant) are convex.
Producers face a single price for the inputs x, p . For the
differentiated input q, producers face an entire nonlinear price
function p(z;a) where z is the vector of qualities and a is a vector of
parameters of the hedonic price function. The reason for parameterizing
p by a is that if there are multiple markets, there will most likely be
multiple distinct hedonic price functions. This is problematic. What
^It is well known (e.g., Starrett, 1971) that production functions
involving externalities may involve nonconvexities. We assume all
operations are in the convex region.
we want is a single function that yields these different hedonic price
functions by varying the parameter a. In fact, if a single market is
under consideration, then a is constant and can be suppressed. However,
if multiple markets are of concern, with multiple equilibrium price
functions, a allows us to distinguish sunong them (see McConnell and
Phipps, 1987).
The producer's problem is to solve
C{p^,a,y, c) = min gp(z,a) + p^
q,z,x
(2)
s. t. g(x,q,z,y, t) ^
q, z, X ^ .
This minimization defines an optimal value function giving the minimum
cost of producing y. Note that as is conventional, all quantities are
non-negative. The constraint set for (2) is convex (since g is
quasi-convex). If p is convex in (z,a), then the objective function in
(2) is convex, and thus C is concave in prices and a over the region
where solutions to (2) exist (Mangasarian and Rosen, 1964).
First-order conditions for the solution of (2) are
p(z,a) = p^ ^ (3a)
3x
'.P = ^ -^ (3b)
along with the constraints of (2). The left-hand side of (3a) is the
hedonic price function and of (3b) the derivative of the hedonic price
function. The right-hand side of (3a) is the technical rate of
substitution between q and x while for (3b) it is the same with respect
to z and x. Equation (3b) represents equality between the marginal
prices of quality and the marginal rate of transformation. Effectively,
X is the numeraire good as equation (3) is written. If q is exogenous
(q is frequently assumed to be unity in hedonic models), then (3a) may
be suppressed.
The conventional approach is to estimate (3), possibly in
conjunction with the hedonic price function itself. Focusing on
equation (3b), both sides of the equation involve endogenous variables.
In fact, it has been pointed out by a number of authors that generally
there may be problems in identifying all of the parameters in equation
(3) (see McConnell and Phipps, 1987; Bartik, 1987; Epple, 1987).
Demand functions or their equivalent can be derived using the
envelope theorem:
dc
dp.
= X* (4a)
v„C = g*7.p(z*,a) (4b)
where x*, q* and z* indicate the optimal choices of x, q and z derived
from equation (2). Equation (4a) is a demand function as written.
Equation (4b) implicitly defines the demand for q and z as a function of
(p^,a,y,t), although there may be some redundancy in (4b) if there are
more a's than elements of (q,z).
Note that while the production function, g, does not contain any
parameters, a, of the hedonic price function, the cost function (2)
does. It is appropriate to ask why it is necessary to carry the
"baggage" of the entire price function, in terms of a, in order to
represent costs and demands. In his 1974 article on hedonic prices,
Rosen argues that marginal prices (V^p) are sufficient to parameterize
demand for a differentiated product. However, that discussion applied
to a single equilibrium; i.e., a single market. Thus a is constant. It
is easy to see that simply knowing marginal prices at an equilibrium is
insufficient to recover costs and demand if a is not known. The only
exception to this is when p is linear in which case V^p does not depend
on a.
B. The Hedonic Price Function
We now turn to the hedonic price function, representing the price
of the differentiated input as a function of quality. While at one
level this is a simple concept, by adding some structure to the problem,
we can derive curvature and other restrictions on the price function (at
least for some cases).
The general framework we consider is as outlined above where the
differentiated input has quality z and the unit price of the
differentiated input is given by p(z;a). As pointed out by Rosen
(1974), in many cases nothing more can be said about p(z;a) except that
it is monotonic in z, provided z is properly defined. He argues that it
is generally appropriate to exclude arbitrage among characteristics. It
thus becomes impossible to impose restrictions on the curvature of the
price function. Specifically, he excludes untying (two average quality
employees cannot be untied to yield one high quality and one low quality
employee)
. However, it turns out that repackaging is sometimes
plausible. While it is not appropriate to repackage a low quality and a
high quality employee as two medium quality employees, a pound of high
sulfur coal can be repackaged with a pound of low sulfur coal to yield
two pounds of medium sulfur coal.
This illustrates an entire class of quality differentiated inputs
that arises when the quality of an input is derived from undesirable
impurities. The basic problem is that the "good" aspects of the input
are bundled with the "bad" aspects of the input and they cannot be
costlessly unbundled. For instance, reflecting back to the example of
sulfur in coal, the heat content of the coal (desirable) is bundled with
the sulfur (undesirable) . If these two products could have been
economically unbundled, that would have been done. A negative
valuation of the externality (smoke) induces a negative valuation on the
bundled bad (sulfur).
To be somewhat more precise, consider a single market in which
bundled commodities (consisting of bads and goods) are available in a
variety of bundlings. Let the vector of bads be denoted by B and the
vector of goods by G. Note that B and G are not characteristics but
''Several authors have considered production theory involving the
generation of externalities. Pittman (1981, 1983) estimates production
functions taking into account undesirable outputs and finds some
striking differences from the case where these outputs are ignored.
Tran and Smith (1983) estimate a joint output production function where
outputs are of electricity and air and water pollutants. Gollop and
Roberts (1983, 1985) come closest to the subject of this paper by
estimating a cost function for electric power, taking into account the
price of two grades of fuel and "regulatory intensity." While their
choice of variables may have been adequate for measuring productivity
change, they do not treat explicitly the tradeoffs between negative and
positive inputs. Furthermore, their "regulatory intensity" variable is
inadequate to induce the correct firm preferences regarding positive and
negative inputs.
8quantities of bads and goods. In the coal example, B and G would be
scalers with B total quantity of sulfur and G total thermal content.
The sulfur fraction (such as percent sulfur) would not qualify as
appropriate for B since that would be a negative characteristic, not a
quantity of the bad.
Denote the value of a transaction for the bundle (B,G) by the
function V(B,G) . There are two properties we would expect V to possess.
We would expect it to be subadditive:
v{B,a) + v{B,d) ^ v{B-^B,a-^a)
,
(^)
where (B,G) and (B,G) are two bundles. Equation (5) must hold since
(B+B,G+G) can trivially be assembled from (B,G) and (B,G)
.
Furthermore, we would expect an unbundled bad to be non-positively
valued and an unbundled good to be positively valued. This implies V is
monotone in each component of (B,G).
If we assume that there are constant returns in providing the
bundle, then V will be homogeneous of degree one; furthermore, from
equation (5), V will be convex. Thus we can pick a numeraire good, G^,
and rewrite V as
ViB.O) = G^{b,g) (6)
where
b,- = Bj/G^, i = 1,...,M
gj = Gj/G^, j = 1,...,N-1.
This is the more conventional situation where the bundle has a unit
price expressed in terms of one of the goods (silicon in dollars per
pound; coal in dollars per million Btu). Thus the b and g are now
characteristics of a unit of the commodity and p(b,g) is a hedonic price
function.
The possibility of repackaging follows from subadditivity and
homogeneity of p. To see this, consider two bundles with
characteristics (b,g) and (b,g) and an arbitrary < X < 1; homogeneity
and subadditivity imply
Xp{£,^) + (i-X)p(£,sr) = v{XB,k^,k) + v^((i-X)£, (i-X)sr, (1-X))
(7)
2: v(x£^{i-k)£.x^+{i-x)^,i) = p{x£^{i-x)£,x^+{i-x)m
where the inequality is from (5). This implies p is convex which is
equivalent to permitting repackaging. Monotonicity of p follows from
monotonicity of V.
It is useful to interpret the meaning of hedonic prices in the case
of negative characteristics. If someone is purchasing a bundle
consisting of a good and a bad, then the more of the bad purchased, the
lower the bundle price. The marginal price on the bad represents a
"bribe" or compensation for agreeing to take the bad along with the
good. For instance, the thermal value of the coal may be $2 per million
Btu. But by agreeing to take one half a unit of sulfur along with a
unit of heat, at a sulfur price of -50<:, one only pays $1.75 per million
Btu: $2 for the heat less a 50C x 1/2 = 25<t: bribe to take the sulfur,
to compensate for the difficulties associated with using the sulfur. In
this case, convexity results in the absolute value of the price of the
10
sulfur characteristic diminishing as the concentration of sulfur
increases.
III. THE TECHNOLOGY OF COAL-FIRED ELECTRICITY GENERATION
We now turn to implementing the theory presented in the previous
section. The production process we consider is that of coal-fired
electricity generation in the U.S. Coal combustion is a major source of
air pollution, including acid rain, and has been subject to relatively
strict emissions regulation in the U.S. since at least 1970. These
regulations have induced negative prices on emissions of sulfur dioxide
and consequently on inputs of sulfur. A complicating factor is that
regulations keep changing and different regulations apply to different
vintages of technologies. We deal with this by restricting our
attention to those coal-fired power plants permitted between 1970 and
1979—the period in which all new plants were only subject to an
emission limit on sulfur.
An interesting characteristic of this industry and production
technology is that producers generally can choose from a variety of
different coals whose price varies inversely with the sulfur content,
is price premium for low sulfur coal has been induced in large part by
environmental regulations in coal combustion. In order to meet the
emission regulation, a producer can choose costly low-sulfur coal or
less expensive higher sulfur coal and use desulfurization capital
(scrubbers) at the generating station. Thus we have a classic choice of
paying for higher quality fuel or paying for desulfurization capital.
It is of significant policy and academic interest to quantify the
tradeoffs that can be made between sulfur and capital. Certainly there
11
have been engineering studies of the cost of scrubbers as add-ons. That
is an oversimplification of the sulfur-capital tradeoff. As capital is
substituted for sulfur, fuel costs drop and operating costs may increase
due to efficiency losses. The appropriate way to measure the costs
associated with desulfurization capital is to estimate a cost function
for the technology based on actual firm-level experience.
Another issue which can only be addressed in a cost function
framework is the effect on costs of ash in the coal. Ash is undesirable
because of regulation on emissions of flyash, but probably more
importantly, ash can degrade the performance and/or shorten the life of
boilers, crushers and other coal-handling equipment at a generating
unit. Thus ash increases production costs.
Finally, the extent to which technical change has reduced costs or
been biased towards one input or another is also a germane question.
Our approach to estimating the production technology is to
partition the eastern half of the U.S. into K distinct regions (states
or groups of states) and estimate a hedonic price function for coal in
each region on a yearly basis. We then estimate, over all regions and
time periods simultaneously, a cost function in conjunction with factor
demand equations for the generating technology.
As mentioned earlier, there have been several papers (Epple, 1987;
Bartik, 1987) pointing out that when one is estimating a technical rate
of substitution equation such as (3b), the marginal prices (left-hand
side of (3b)) depend on z which appear on the right-hand side. Thus z
is correlated with the error term, in which case OLS estimation of each
12
equation is inappropriate. Furthermore, McConnell and Phipps (1987)
show that the hedonic equation may not even be identified.
The sample we use to estimate our hedonic price functions includes
all utility coal transactions; this is a set containing many more
producers and consumers than we consider in our cost function
estimation. Consequently, it is reasonable to assume in our case that
the cost function errors are uncorrelated with the hedonic price
function errors. Thus we use OLS for each of the hedonic price
functions.
The question of ex-ante vs. ex-post technology has surfaced again
and again in estimating electric power production functions (e.g..
Cowing & Smith, 1978; Fuss and McFadden, 1978). When firms make their
capital investment decisions, they make them on the basis of expected
future input and output prices as well as uncertainty in those prices.
Expected factor prices determine the tradeoff between capital and
variable factors. Uncertainty in price expectations influences the
flexibility built into the ex-ante technology. Unfortunately, one does
not observe price expectations. Our approach is to adopt a rational
expectations hypothesis regarding future factor prices and to ignore the
flexibility-efficiency issue. We estimate input prices for the first
full year of unit operation and assume all generating units in our
sample make ex-ante investment decisions based on those realized factor
prices.
13
A. Hedonic Prices of the Bundled Inputs
Our view of coal is that thermal content is the characteristic
utilities desire. The two major impurities found in most coals are
sulfur and ash. Sulfur is undesirable because its emissions are subject
to control. Increased ash content tends to degrade boiler performance,
lowering output.
1. The Sample . To estimate the hedonic price function we use all
reported purchases of coal by regulated electric utilities in the
1976-85 period. Fuel data (see appendix) includes information on price
and quantity as well as sulfur, ash and thermal content. Each
transaction is reported to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.
2. The Price Function . We assume that the transaction function
V(F,S,A) in equation (5) is homogeneous of degree 1, so we work in terms
of the price function p(s,a;a). F is fuel in millions of Btu, S is
sulfur content in pounds and A is ash in pounds. Sulfur content, s,
equals S/F and ash content, a, equals A/F. As argued earlier, the
hedonic price function is monotone and convex in s and a. Monotonicity
assures us that the implicit prices always have the same sign (e.g.,
sulfur is always a bad and thermal content is always a good) . Convexity
yields downward sloping implicit demand functions (among other things).
We have chosen a quadratic for the price function so that convexity can
be imposed globally. It is difficult to impose monotonicity on a
quadratic over a specific region and is of course impossible to impose
globally without reducing prices to a linear function. Thus the price
function has the form
14
(8)
where a and s are the ash and sulfur levels (per thermal unit of coal).
We require the matrix of a-, to be symmetric and positive semi-definite.
Marginal prices for sulfur (S), ash (A) and thermal content (F) can
be easily computed from (8):
"5 =
HI- 1''
ds
= a^ + a^^s + a^^a
(9a)
^Pii'i'''
dA
(9b)
u^ =
Hff-
dF
= p is,a; a) - us - u.a
(9c)
Note that convexity of p gives a-- > 0. Thus for i = S,A, even if
a. < 0, it is still possible for u- > (we would expect u- to be
non-positive for i = S,A)
.
3. The Estimation . One of the key distinguishing characteristics
of the coal market is that coal prices vary over space. The closer one
is to a low sulfur deposit, the lower the price of low sulfur coal.
Thus it would be inappropriate to estimate a single hedonic price
function for the whole U.S. Rather we estimate a series of functions
for regions of the country. The sample of generating units discussed in
the previous section determines the regions of the country for which we
are interested in hedonic price functions. We have estimated a separate
hedonic price function for each of the states where a sample generating
unit is located.
i
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Equation (8) was estimated separately for each state and each year
so that a price equation was available for the first full year of
operation of each generating unit. Thus in general a different function
was estimated for each generating unit in the sample. Convexity was
imposed heuristically and the function was restricted to be downward
sloping with respect to s and a at the origin (i.e., a^ < 0, a^ < 0).
Results of the estimation are given in the appendix. Although the
adjusted R^ was generally low, the coefficients were quite significant
due to the large sample size. The a so estimated were used as exogenous
variables in the cost function, described in the following section.
B. The Electricity Production Technology
1. The Sample . The goal is to estimate the technology of
coal-fired power generation including a representation of the possible
tradeoffs between fuel quality and the use of other factors (such as
capital) induced by environmental regulations. The difficulty of this
task is compounded by the fact that current emissions regulations for
sulfur dioxide dictate technology, giving the firm little leeway in
choice of fuel or technology. Fortunately, during the period 1971-1979,
the new source performance standards in the U.S. specified a limit on
sulfur emissions of 1.2 pounds per million Btu of fuel burned. The
regulation left it completely up to the firm as to how this emission
limit should be met. The regulation was applicable to all generating
units whose initial license was sought during this period. Because of
the long-lead times involved in plant construction, most units that have
become operational in the late 1970s through the mid-1980s fall under
this regulation.
16
Another compounding factor is that most data are at the plant
level/ with each plant made up of several generating units of
potentially different vintages. And it is the generating units to which
environmental regulations apply. A single plant can have some units
subject to no new source regulations, some units subject to the original
new source performance standard, and some units subject to the current
new source performance standard. As a consequence of this we must
further restrict our sample to plants where all the units are subject to
the same emission regulation so that the necessary data are available.
A final consideration is that generating units in much of the
western U.S. were essentially unconstrained by the original new source
performance standard. Local low-sulfur coal was not only the cheapest,
but also was capable of meeting the 1.2 pounds per million Btu limit
without any additional costs. Thus western power plants were eliminated
from our sample.
We are left with 51 different generating units spread over the
eastern half of the U.S. These constitute our sample.^
2. The Cost Function . As was discussed earlier, our goal is to
estimate a cost function, equation (2). Three problems with adopting a
flexible functional form for this cost function are a) some variables
are negative; b) some variables are positive and negative; and c)
sometimes variables go to zero. Thus any function involving logarithms
or square roots of prices and/or parameters (such as the translog or
generalized Leontieff) is unacceptable. We have chosen the Generalized
Publicly and cooperatively owned units are excluded due to a lack
of data.
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McFadden Cost Function (GM) as discussed by Diewert and Wales (1987).
This functional form has the advantage of allowing variables to take on
positive or negative values and, with the exception of the numeraire
good, zero values. Furthermore, we can impose convexity globally.
For notational simplicity, let w = (a,p^) , with W the dimension of
w. Thus the cost function in (2) can be written, following Diewert and
Wales (1987),
C{p^,a,Y,t) - C{w,Y,t) = g{w)Y^ J^ bi^w^Y
!•!
W W
1=1
(
'
\
E b^w,
U = i 1
(10a)
/ »
+ bYY
\
Vi-i /
E '^i'^i t^Y
with
g{w) = (1/2) w;^ J^ Y, ^ij^i^j ^^^^ ^ij = <^ji
i=2 j=2
for 2 <, i, j <, W
(10b)
and with the parameters 5, B and y set arbitrarily in advance to scale
the problem. There are W(W-l)/2 different c-- in equation (10b) and
3W+3 additional b parameters in equation (10a). Constant returns to
scale imply the restrictions that b- = b^ = byy = for i = 1,...,W. Let
C be the (W-l)x(W-l) square matrix consisting of c--, 2 < i,j < W.
Diewert and Wales (1987) show that the cost function C is concave in w
if and only if C is negative semidef inite.
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3. The Estimation . In our application, there are four inputs into
production. Three are bundled together in coal: sulfur (S), ash (A),
both of which are bads, and heat (F). One input, capital (K) , is
unbundled. We have neglected labor because of its modest role in
generation costs, ^ as well as our desire to restrict the number of
exogenous variables, given our small sample size. Data sources are
discussed in the appendix.
In estimating the cost function (10), it is appropriate to utilize
the fact that it results from cost minimization, namely estimating the
cost function simultaneously with optimality conditions (4). Let the w
vector in (10) be w = (Pk',ac,a_,a^,a^^,a^^,a^^) . Then using (8) we can
translate (4) into
^'^
-
^^ (11a)
(lib;
A* -
dP^
F* =
dc
da.
S* = dC
dcts
A* = dc
5«a
(lie)
(lid)
In 1983, variable costs for producing power (from all fuel
sources) in the U.S. were $56 billion of which 6 percent was non-fuel
expenses excluding returns to capital; thus at most 6 percent of
variable costs are labor. In our sample, the value share of capital in
total generating costs ranges roughly between 40 percent to 75 percent.
Thus labor plays a very small role in total costs.
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111 = J£. (12a)
2F* da,.
^*^*
=
-^ (12b)
^*'
-
^^ (12c)
2F* aa^^
•
This system is overdetermined in that there are five endogenous
variables, C, K*, F*, S* and A* and eight equations, including the cost
function. Thus, any five equations give sufficient information to
determine the endogenous variables. We focus on (10-11), discarding
(12) as redundant and assuming there is additive error associated with
each endogenous variable, related to errors in optimization. We then
estimate the five equations using a nonlinear iterative Zellner approach
as implemented in TSP4.1. Table I presents results of the estimation
with t-statistics in parentheses. As Diewert and Wales (1987) show,
concavity of the cost function over strictly positive prices and outputs
is equivalent to the matrix of Cj- in equation (10b) being negative
semidef inite. Lau (1978) shows that any negative semidefinite matrix
can be written as LDL' where L is lower triangular with I's on the
diagonal and D is a nonpositive diagonal matrix. The model was
estimated using these Cholesky factors of the c-- matrix to impose
concavity. Comparing the unrestricted and the restricted model using a
likelihood ratio test, concavity could be rejected at the 95% level but
not at the 96% level.
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IV. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS
There are a number of interesting results that emerge from the
estimation. One set of results concerns the hedonic price function for
coal. As an equilibrium concept, the hedonic price function tells us
how the market values differ in the sulfur and ash content in fuel.
Another set of results concerns the nature of the generating technology
and the extent of technical change. We address each of these two issues
separately.
A. The Sulfur/Ash Penalty
Figure la is a plot of the average estimated hedonic price function
(i.e., p(s,a;a) where a is the mean value of a over the sample). Shown
in the figure is price as a function of sulfur content, with ash content
held at the generating unit sample mean (9.01 lb/10^ Btu). As sulfur
content decreases, the price of coal in terms of the numeraire good,
million Btu, increases. If sulfur content is reduced from 1.5% to 0.5%,
the price of coal rises about 20<t: per million Btu. Note that for large
sulfur content, monotonicity starts to break down, with price increasing
with increases in sulfur content.
Figure lb shows the implicit price of sulfur (equation (9a)), as a
function of sulfur content, using the same sample average hedonic price
function parameter values and ash level. There are several things to
note from the figure. First, as with Figure la, for large values of
sulfur content, price goes anomalously positive. This is due to the
limitations of the quadratic hedonic price function which yields linear
marginal prices. Secondly, for lower levels of sulfur content, the
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"price" of sulfur is highest in absolute value and declines as sulfur
content increases. Remembering that the hedonic price function is an
equilibrium concept, this reflects the fact that it is more and more
costly to reduce sulfur content to lower and lower levels. To interpret
this price further, consider prices from the average price function at
the sample average sulfur content, 1.366 lb. S/10^ Btu. At this sulfur
content, the price of coal is $1.60 per million Btu, with the price of
heat, sulfur and ash respectively $1.81 per million Btu, $-0,071 per
pound of sulfur and $-0,121 per pound of ash (from equation (9)). Thus,
when a customer buys a million Btu of heat energy in coal for $1.82, he
or she accepts the sulfur and ash impurities for compensation of 10<:
(a^ X s = 0.071 X 1.366) and IIC (a^ x a = 0.121 x .901), resulting in a
S 3
total price for the coal bundle of $1.60. The computed price of coal
ranges from 890 to $2.83 over the sample with an average of $1.61 per
million Btu. The price of heat ranges from 990 to $2.49 per million
Btu. The price of sulfur and ash range from -$.38 and -120 per pound,
respectively, to positive values. The sulfur and ash "bribes" are as
high as 740 and 730 per million Btu, averaging 180 and 120,
respectively.
The Federal government and others are currently spending large sums
to improve the technology for reducing sulfur level in coal. Our model
can be used to infer upper limits on the cost and performance of such
technologies. Any new desulfurization technology would change the
^The positive values reflect, as in Figure lb, the restrictions
imposed by a quadratic hedonic price function—namely that marginal
prices are linear. Positive prices on sulfur and ash explain why the
highest price of coal (bundled with impurities) is higher than the
highest price of the good thermal content.
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marginal valuation on sulfur, although it is difficult to say in what
direction. Prices of low-sulfur coal would be reduced, prices of
high-sulfur coal might increase from increased demand or might stay
constant. Figure 1 does give an indication of the maximum
desulfurization cost the market might currently support, on average.
For instance, to reduce the sulfur content of coal from the generating
unit sample mean to 0.6 lb. S/10^ Btu (formerly known as compliance
coal), producers could currently expect a price premium of 23<: per
million Btu or about $5 per ton (assuming 22 million Btu per ton coal).
This would be the upper limit on the cost of achieving that reduction in
sulfur, assuming ash content does not change. This of course is on
average. Specific geographic markets may support a greater premium.
B. Factor Substitution and Technical Change
in Electricity Generation
In Section III of the paper we discussed the estimation of a cost
function for coal-fired electricity generation. The typical approach to
understanding the economic characteristics of such a cost function is to
look at the price elasticities of factor demand, elasticities of
substitution among factors and the bias and level of technical change.
Factor demand is relatively easily obtained from the cost function,
as in equation (11). Sensitivity of factor demand with respect to the
price of capital is straightforward. How such demand changes with
respect to the price of coal is more ambiguous since the price of coal
is a function (of heat, sulfur and ash), not a scalar. For instance,
consider a coal with the price function given in Figure la. A change in
the hedonic price function could involve the price function in the
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figure shifting up or down, corresponding to a change in a,; or the
function could rotate, changing the price of sulfur and ash.
Furthermore, the function could remain unchanged locally while changing
substantially elsewhere. A non-local change in the price function could
induce a consumer to substantially shift a consumption bundle.
We will consider three shifts in the hedonic price function for
coal: basically an upward or downward shift in the price of sulfur, ash
or heat; i.e., changes in the parameters a,, cc^ and a^. An upward
r S 3
change in a would cause the sulfur price line in Figure lb to shift
upwards; the hedonic price function in Figure la would tend to flatten
(since its slope is the price of sulfur).
As a consequence, using equation (11), we can define the following
own- and cross-price elasticities of demand:
e.. =
^^ p. + -^ (13)
^' dPidPj ^ dPi
where
Pi =
P^ for i = K
a
J
for i = F, S,A.
What sign do we expect for these elasticities? The law of demand
generally calls for negative own-price elasticities. Concavity of costs
implies
_ - ^ 0, using the notation in equation (13). Furthermore,
Qj < for i = S,A. As an example, consider the case of sulfur. As a
increases, the price line (Figure lb) shifts upward making S less
desirable to accept. Thus, one would expect consumption of S to
decrease. However, a^ is negative, thus we expect e-- > 0. Similar
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logic yields positive own-price elasticities for ash. Similarly, we can
define the Allen elasticities of substitution:
C
a
dP,dP, e1
^^
' dc dc ' e^
1 = la (14)
dPi dPj
P X
where 6^- = -^-^ , Xj = K,F,S,A
and P_j. = ^
Pjf. for i = K
a^ for i = F,S,A,
In contrast to price elasticities, we expect own substitution
elasticities to always be negative, since 0^ and 6g are negative.
Table II presents price and substitution elasticities evaluated at
the mean (over the generating unit sample) of the exogenous variables.
The t-statistics are computed from a second-order expansion of equations
(15)-(16). As can be seen, he signs of own elasticities are as
expected: own-price elasticity for sulfur and ash should be
non-negative. The ash price elasticity is significantly positive
although the other own-price elasticities are not significantly
non-zero.
The results in Table II suggest that the demands for fuel and ash
are relatively inelastic and the elasticity of demand for capital close
to unity. Both price elasticities between capital and fuel suggest
substitution; however, the elasticity of substitution is positive
suggesting complementarity. As the price of capital goes up, fuel use
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goes up but capital use goes down even more resulting in the positive
substitution elasticity. In contrast, the price elasticities between
ash and capital both suggest substitutability in the sense that as
capital becomes more expensive, ash is increased. We would expect
complementarity
.
During the decade covered by our sample, significant advances were
being made in generating technologies although other factors such as
regulatory problems have been suggested as adding to costs. Table III
shows the estimates of measures of technical change for our sample. It
is clear that technical progress tended to be capital-using at a
significant rate of 3% per year and basically neutral with respect to
fuel use. Interestingly, technical change is sulfur and ash saving at
very substantial rates. This suggests that there has been a substantial
shift to higher quality fuel, induced by technical change.
Finally we turn to the question of scale economies. As was
indicated earlier, we are able to reject the hypothesis of constant
returns to scale in generating. In fact, scale economies seem to be
very substantial. Scale economies as defined by Christensen and Greene
(1970) are 0.1952 (constant returns implies a zero scale elasticity),
suggesting that at the mean of the exogenous variables
(Y = 3.23 X 10 kwh/yr = 550 MW) , there are still scale economies to be
realized, at least in generation, ignoring reliability.
V. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has developed a new method for estimating a production
technology involving bundled inputs, some of which are negatively
valued. We have seen that production theory can be "directly" applied o
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this problem although because negative inputs are necessarily bundled
with positive inputs, a hedonic analysis is necessary to infer implicit
prices to use in estimating the production technology. It is hoped that
future work can build on this base, generating better interpretations of
substitution and price elasticities, among other things.
i
1
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DATA APPENDIX
All the generating unit data are constructed for the first full
year of unit operation. This is assumed to be one year after the
published date at which the unit enters commercial operation since that
published date may correspond to an incomplete year. The first full
year of operation is referred to "the first year of operation plus one."
Data used for estimating the cost function are given in Tables A-I
through A-III.
A. Quantity of Capital
The basic source at the unit level is "Construction Costs of U.S.
Steam Electric Plants 1970-1985," Utility Data Institute, Inc. The
costs have to be adjusted because they are calculated as the sum of the
yearly capital expenditures during construction. A method proposed by
Joskow and Rose (1985) permits us to correct for the effect of changes '
in prices and interest rates during the construction period (assumed to
be five years)
:
Total costs in 1st nominal costs
year of operation
g
E 5.
c-i
t 5
H (l^p(i))- H (l + r(j)
.1-1 j'-c
(A-1)
where S^ is the share of actual construction expenses in year t with
t = 6 being the year of first operation (source: Personal
Communication, Nancy Rose, 1987): S. = .10, S^ = .32, S, = .39,
S^ = .15, and S^ = .03; p(i) is the percentage change in input prices in
year i (from the Handy-Whitman Construction Cost Index for all Steam
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Plant by regions, taken from the Moody Utility Manual); r(j) is the
average allowance for funds used during construction in year j (from
Financial Statistics of Selected Electric Utilities, Energy Information
Administration, Table 16: Electric Utility Plant Construction Work in
Progress and Table 17: Net Income and Allowance for Funds Used During
Construction) . Costs so calculated are then adjusted to 1976 using the
regional Handy-Whitman construction cost index to obtain the quantity of
capital.
B. Price of Capital Services
The price of capital services is calculated following the
Christensen and Jorgenson (1969) approach for the first year of
operation plus one:
a-uz--k
Pi = —^z^ C^i,t-i^ ^ ^it^f - (gi,t-^i,t-i)] ^^i^ (A-2)
where u is the Effective Corporate Tax rate from the "U.S. Long Term
Review," Data Resources, Inc; z is the present value of $1 of
depreciation for tax purposes,
z= -L [i-(^) V (A-3)
rC 1+r
and t is the life of the utility for tax purposes which is assumed to be
28 years (based on estimates in Christensen et al., 1980). Note that
the price of capital services is in nominal terms and will escalate with
the price level.
k is the investment tax credit rate. Two series are available in
the DRI "U.S. Long Term Review." One is for equipment and the other for
public utilities structures. As the power plant cost data published by
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the Utility Data Institute are broken down into land, structures and
equipment, it is possible to construct, for each unit, a weighted
average of the structures series and equipment series using the ratio of
equipment over total costs and of structures over total costs as
weights.
q is the price of capital measured with the Handy Whitman index and
broken down into six main regions (table entitled: Costs Trends of
Electric Light and Power Construction from Moody's Nation Wide Survey of
Public Utility Progress). The July 1st observation for the relevant
region is chosen with July 1, 1976, as the base year.
r is the rate of return. It is calculated as a weighted average of
the rate of return on common equity, r , and the rate of return on long
term debt, r .. The weights are constructed with the help of the
capitalization ratios presented in the "Statistics of Privately Owned
Electric Utilities in the United States (DOE/EIA-0044, Table 37:
Selected Financial Indicators). The rate of return of common equity,
r^, is also available in the above table. r . is the coupon rate of the
long term bonds issued in the first year of operation plus one. It is
taken from the Moody's Public Utility Manual. Finally, in the case of a
publicly owned utility, the rate of return is assumed to be the 30-year
Treasury bonds rate. (Note that these financial data are only available
by utility, they are not specific to the generating unit.)
d is the economic rate of depreciation. Following Christensen
et al. (1980), it was chosen using the 1.5 declining balance method and
using their engineering estimates of 33 years for the average service
life; hence d = 1.5/33 = .045.
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T is the effective rate of property taxation in the relevant
county. The sources are the 1977 and the 1982 Census of Government,
Volume II, entitled, Taxable Property Values and Assessment Sales Price
Ratios. The year closest to the first year of operation plus one was
chosen and the rates were adjusted in order to apply to land and
structures only. (Note that the data were not very specific but it is
likely that the error introduced by totally ignoring T would be
greater.
)
C. Quantity of Output
The quantity of output is constructed as quantity of coal purchased
divided by the heat rate (thermal efficiency) ; this assumes that the
quantity of coal purchased is approximately equal to the quantity of
coal used. The reason for using this measure of output is that some
units are multi-fuel. The quantity of coal is reported on FERC Form 423
and is also available in "Cost and Quality of Fuels for Electric Utility
Plants (various years). The heat rate for each plant is published in
Thermal-Electric Plant Construction and Annual Production Expenses
(DOE/EIA-0323)
.
D. Sulfur Ash and Fuel in the Hedonic Price Functions
All electric utility transactions for coal are reported in FERC
Form 423. Quality characteristics for these transactions include price,
thermal content and sulfur and ash content in percent by weight. These
data were used to estimate the hedonic price functions, converting
sulfur into pounds per million Btu, ash into pounds per 100,000 Btu and
price in $ per million Btu in order to estimate the price functions; the
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quantity data for fuel are converted into million Btu using the reported
Btu per pound conversion factor. All transactions in a state during a
year were used to estimate the individual hedonic price functions. In a
few cases, neighboring small states were aggregated to increase sample
size. Table A-III contains the results of the estimation of the hedonic
price function for each generating unit.
E. Total Costs
Total costs for the cost function are calculated for the first year
of operation plus one. They are constructed as the sum of the value of
capital services calculated above and the value of coal for the first
year of operation plus one. The value of coal is obtained by
multiplying price per short ton by quantity in short tons, with the data
from FERC Form 42 3, discussed above.
CK.1-7
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TABLE I
Cost Function Parameter Estimates, With
and Without Imposition of Convexity
Unrestricted Model Concavity Imposed
Asymptotic Asymptotic
Parameter Estimate t-Statistic Estimate t-Statistic
''f
-0.51992E--03 -0.91708 -0.45598E--03 -0.79222
"s
0.34822E--01 1.1269 -0.44712E--02 -0.30738
\ -0.40026E--01 -1.9314 -0.43419E--02 -0.16927
°S2
0.22688E--02 0.59855
\s -31.551 -0.24854
\2 29.306 0.27261
S-F -2.8327 -0.43943 -0.28535 -0.61237E--01
^A-F 4.3082 0.87582 . 7.8370 0.82138
"-sa-F
-0.59148 -0.28143 -0.12389 -0.62996E--01
^AS-F -1.3519 -0.12777 8.9134 0.58354
^a2-F 7.0469 0.82556 9.0313 0.73985
^A-S 0.13881 0.24555 -1.5009 -0.40203
^S2-S 0.22112 0.52843 0.35424 0.20673
^kS-S 3.4908 0.92461 -4.1757 -0.44703
\2-S -1.6362 -1.1615 0.65619 0.97960E--01
S2-A -0.43145E--01 -0.42966 0.54014E--01 0.13636E--01
^AS-A 2.0333 2.0222 -0.85650 -0.64347E--01
^a2-A 0.73139 1.1548 2.7360 0.29723
^3-32 121.18 0.41997
''A2-S2
-472.75 -0.57531
^a2-AS -4.1236 -0.53235
\t 0.61250E--01 2.5274 0.48166E--01 1.9334
^^ -0.90545E--02 -2.4651 -0.87936E--02 -2.3998
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TABLE I (continued)
Parameter
St
At
^S2t
^ASt
A'^t
FF
SS
AA
^S2s2
ASAS
Va2
tt
b,.
h^
AS
^2
Unrestricted Model Concavity Imposed
Asymptotic Asymptotic
Estimate t-Statistic Estimate t-Statistic
0.57384E-01 -4.3377 -0.59112E-01 -4.4780
0.22051E-01 -6.3406 -0.24323E-01 -7.0601
0.96125E-01 -1.3972 -0.12665 -1.8594
0.37400 1.0680 -0.17668E-01 -0.72358E--01
0.83813E-01 -2.2931 -0.50897E-01 -1.7789
0.78528E-04 0.10422 0.21619E-04 0.28730E-01
0.36547 26.288 0.36590 26.334
0.69487 5.9888 0.70369 6.0279
0.43161 12.495 0.45831 13.430
0.90480 1.2292 1.2482 1.7236
3.0128 1.2721 3.9809 1.9859
0.48960 1.5974 0.65471 2.6174
0.51169 2.6866 0.61853 3.1549
0.41869E-02 -2.0338 -0.48127E-02 -2.3337
0.31983E-03 2.3737 0.31996E-03 2.3704
0.72182 4.8588 0.65698 4.3206
0.12453E-01 1.1717 0.86410E-02 0.81717
0.14049 1.9212 0.81958E-01 1.1479
0.17841E-01 0.92401 0.19003E-01 0.99036
0.75980E-01 0.37769 0.59163E-01 0.30694
-2.8000 -2.3830 -2.0672 -2.5521
0.35923 1.8805 0.47417E-03 0.55399E--02
Note: Sample size =51; C in (12b) factored into LDL' ; concavity imposed
by requiring D < 0.
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TABLE II
Elasticities Model with Concavity Imposed
Price Elasticities
Factors
K-K
K-F
K-S
K-A
F-K
F-F
F-S
F-A
S-K
S-F
S-S
S-A
A-K
A-F
A-S
A-A
Value
Asymptotic
t-Statistic
-0.27815E-01 -0.58826
0.23399E-01
-0.59749E-02
0.21202E-01
0.11049E-01
-0.14045E-01
0.80129E-03
0.14103E-01
0.11781E-01
0.33459E-02
0.23178E-01
-0.25470E-01
0.88662E-01
-0.12490
-0.54019E-01
0.18997
Substitution Elasticities
Asymptotic
Value t-Statistic
-0.79308E-01 -0.60191
0.84390
-0.26534
-1.6117
0.84977
-0.79654
0.31501E-01
0.33588E-01
0.25279
-0.18908E-01
-0.64568E-01 0.45045E-02
2.1358
0.26398
0.64539E-01
0.32531
-1.1309
1.6234
-2.1617
-1.1076
4.7420
-0.16815
•0.13030
0.30368
0.84856
0.26364
1.5782
0.80090
0.64527E-01
-2.1219
•0.32265
1.1211
-2.2649 -4.4514
Note: Price elasticities are of the first member of the factor pairs
with respect to the price of the second; elasticities evaluated
at means of exogenous variables; t-statistics computed using
second order expansions about the means.
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TABLE III
Measures of Technical Change and Scale Elasticity,
Model with Concavity Imposed
Asymptotic
Parameter Value t-Statistic
8£nK
3t 0.0305 1.97
8ZnF
3t -0.000017 -0.006
^^ns
3t -0.1528 -5.12
ainA
3t -0.0868 -8.26
3JlnC
dinY 0.1952 3.292
Note: Elasticities evaluated at means of exogenous variables; t-
statistics computed using second order expansions about the
means
.
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TABLE A- I: Generating Unit Sample Description
Sample Pt. ii^ Plant Unit # State 1st Year MW
1 AB BROWN 1 IN 1980 250
2 AMES TWO 1 lA 1983 65
3 BELLE RIVER 1 MI 1985 655
4 BELLE RIVER 2 MI 1986 655
5 BRANDON SHORES 1 MD 1985 620
6 BRUCE MANSFIELD 1 PA 1977 780
7 BRUCE MANSFIELD 2 PA 1978 780
8 BRUCE MANSFIELD 3 PA 1981 780
9 COUNCIL BLUFFS 1 lA 1979 700
10 CRYSTAL RIVER 1 FL 1983 685
11 CRYSTAL RIVER 2 FL 1985 685
12 DEERHAVEN 1 FL 1982 235
13 DUCK CREEK 1 IL 1977 380
14 EAST BEND 1 KY 1982 600
15 GREEN 1 KY 1980 263
16 GREEN 2 KY 1982 263
17 HAVANA 1 IL 1979 426
18 HOMER CITY 1 PA 1978 650
19 lATAN 1 MO 1981 670
20 INDEPENDENCE 2 AR 1985 815
21 JH CAMPBELL 1 MI 1981 770
22 KILLEN 1 OH 1983 600
23 LANSING 1 lA 1978 260
24 LOUISA 1 lA 1984 650
25 MADGETT 1 WI 1980 349
26 MARION 1 IL 1979 170
27 MAYO 1 NC 1984 705
28 MCINTOSH 1 FL 1983 334
29 MEROM 1 IN 1984 450
30 MEROM 2 IN 1983 450
31 MILLER 1 AL 1979 634
32 MILLER 2 AL 1986 634
33 MOUNTAINEER 1 WV 1981 1300
34 NEWTON 1 IL 1978 550
35 NEWTON 2 IL 1983 562
36 OTTUMWA 1 lA 1982 675
37 PETERSBURG 1 IN 1978 515
38 PLEASANT PRAIRE 1 WI 1981 580
39 PLEASANT PRAIRE 2 WI 1986 580
40 PLEASANTS 1 WV 1980 626
41 PLEASANTS 2 WV 1981 626
42 ROCKPORT 1 IN 1985 1300
43 SHERER 1 GA 1983 808
44 SHERER 2 GA 1985 808
45 SHERBURNE CO 1 MN 1977 700
46 SHERBURNE CO 2 MN 1978 700
47 SOUTHWEST 1 MO 1977 194
48 THOMAS HILL 1 MO 1983 630
49 VJ DANIEL 1 MS 1978 505
50 VJ DANIEL 2 MS 1982 505
51 WESTON 1 WI 1982 321
!
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